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# CHRISTIANITY and CRISIS

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*A Christian Journal of Opinion*

## France: Renaissance or Reversal?

Americans continue to watch with undisguised fascination the course of events in Paris. On one hand, the trends that Professor Duroselle points to in "An Optimistic Look at the Fifth Republic" (see page 4) suggest a renaissance of French greatness. On the other hand, there are indications of a possible reversal of the fortuitous combination of events that heralded the first seven months of leadership by General de Gaulle. On the whole France's political recovery remains so spectacular that one hesitates to call attention to less happy signs. Even while holding to a more optimistic view of the future, however, the American observer has some obligation to review more sobering developments.

Not the least unsettling event seen from this side of the Atlantic has been the withdrawal of Guy Mollet as Minister of State. Mollet was the linchpin in the political alliance that brought de Gaulle to power. He risked his political career in supporting the General's rise to power. To be sure, he carried only a part of the Socialist Party of which he is secretary general, but his support at a crucial juncture was a decisive factor. Some went so far as to call him the unsung political architect of the Fifth Republic.

Now he has broken with de Gaulle on the issue of "economic liberalism," believing that the laissez-faire philosophy expressed in the new budget will be France's undoing. He sees devaluation of the French franc as almost certain to bring price rises that will fall heavily on the poor and economically oppressed. In his letter of withdrawal he explained that he would have favored state planning and "authoritarian price cuts."

Pressure and criticism aimed at the Government has also come from the Right. The seventy-six Al-

gerian deputies, representative of sentiment for Algeria's integration with France, have pressed their views. By implication at least they have questioned the formula enunciated by de Gaulle in his inaugural statement when he urged Algeria to find a "choice place" in the new French community. These legislators quite unabashedly call for "integral fusion" and hold out scant hope of compromise. One finds barely a trace of a negotiable position in their statement. Right-wing Independents and Peasant Party leaders have likewise been critical.

At the center the Popular Republican Party, while voting two to one to take part in the new cabinet, has directed its criticism at the Government's social, economic and European policies. It finds especially dangerous the new Government's social and agricultural programs of general austerity.

Nor has France's international role been beyond the pale of criticism. As many observers predicted, de Gaulle has moved to the center of the stage to upgrade France's influence and prestige in the world. Some of his statements foreshadow an independent nuclear policy in which France would possess her own thermonuclear weapons capable supposedly of deterring Russia. Others indicate that he fervently hopes for a triumvirate of leaders in the councils of NATO that might confer privately. Whether his views are considered for or against NATO, it seems clear that de Gaulle envisages a core to NATO and that he, Secretary Dulles and Mr. Lloyd would constitute its inner strength. Inevitably de Gaulle's insistence on a paramount role in world affairs will make him more difficult to deal with, but perhaps an independent force that holds to its promises is better than a weak one that cannot.

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Yet there are numerous harbingers of renaissance as well. The new Government has struck hard at the problem of its fiscal and monetary affairs. The devaluation plan daily gains in favor in critical financial circles. The new amnesty and clemency provisions for detained Algerians could lead to a far-reaching reduction of tension with Algeria. Further talk persists that France is negotiating with the F.L.N. through intermediaries in Cairo, though both sides have denied this. If a solution has been reached the results have not been communicated, but even the rumors of serious discussion are heartening.

A recital of actions like this demonstrate the vitality of France's new government. It has seized the nettle on fiscal reform; it shows signs of grappling with France's most troublesome problem: Algeria. If the franc can be stabilized and the colonial problem relieved, France could go forward with great hope into a brighter day.

Perhaps the most compelling reason for believing that France's today will lead to a renaissance tomorrow is the vigor, dispatch and boldness of the General's programs. What the economic consequences of devaluation may be for small wage-earners must be watched with great care. What form Algeria's autonomy will take, if it should be achieved, is also entirely open. The one thing that is assuredly true is that log-jams have been broken and steps of far-reaching consequence taken as executive power has asserted itself. The spectacle of de Gaulle rallying the French people is grounds for hoping that renaissance will turn back any signs of reversal in France's surge ahead.

K. W. T.

## CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE FILIBUSTER

THE ADVOCATES of the extension of civil rights and the abolition of infringements on the suffrage rights of Negroes in the South seemed to have gained much in the past election which saw many "liberals," particularly Democrats, elected to the Senate. The days of the filibuster appeared to be ended when a combination of northern Democratic and Republican leaders combined to challenge Senate Rule XXII, which permits unlimited debate by a minority since cloture could be imposed only by a two-thirds vote of the entire Senate. By this device the South has consistently prevented any civil rights legislation that would challenge the "southern way of life."

But these hopes proved to be premature. The Senate majority leader, Lyndon Johnson, was able to defeat the liberals, led by Democratic Senators Humphrey and Douglas and Republican Senators Javits and Case. He was able to muster a majority of 72 to 22 for an amended rule that changed cloture proceedings only slightly. The new rule requires a two-thirds majority of those present, rather than of the total membership. Since on critical issues only members who are sick are absent, the new rule changes very little.

The advocates of civil rights are universally outraged and many will hold Senator Johnson responsible for frustrating the will of the liberal portion of the nation. The fact that some of the so-called "liberal" senators, particularly the new ones and, most conspicuously, those from the state of Alaska, voted with Johnson would seem to support the thesis that he is an arch Machiavellian who used his power of committee assignments to lead new senators astray. But a more sober analysis will place less blame on Johnson and regard the vote as an indication of the permanent embarrassment in which the Democratic Party finds itself on the race issue. It is a party traditionally rooted in the South that was extended to the North by the political genius of Franklin Roosevelt.

But the political genius of one man could not change past history. The New Deal simply created a party in which, particularly on the race issue, northern liberals were more liberal and southern conservatives are more conservative than their Republican colleagues. This division in the party contributed considerably to two Eisenhower victories over Adlai Stevenson. It may, but probably will not, prevent a Democratic victory in 1960. The reason is that a war hero is not a candidate; in any case much of the halo round his head has been dissipated by the vicissitudes of the past four years. But whether or not the Democratic Party can be victorious, either by northern liberalism's defiance of the southern wing of the party or by following Lyndon Johnson's artful compromise, it is a fact that the Democratic Party is confronted by a situation that Lyndon Johnson did not create, but in which a skillful parliamentarian such as he has tremendous scope.

Our guess is that the Democratic Party can win only by defying the South as Truman was forced to do in 1948. But there is also the possibility that the '60 campaign will include a compromise of

the same type that gave Johnson his most recent victory in the Senate. For part of Johnson's prestige was derived from the fact that he piloted a civil rights bill through the Senate under the old rules. Significantly, the scope of the new legislation has not yet been fully exploited. Perhaps it should be before we speculate about party advantages growing out of civil rights legislation. R. N.

### 'THE NORMALLY TABOO SUBJECT OF RELIGION'

LATE LAST YEAR we lamented editorially the continuing gap between religion and the intellectuals of our time. While religion is currently more "respectable" than ever on all the "lower levels," the editorial pointed out that the Church is partly responsible for failure to communicate its faith in relevant and compelling terms to the sophisticated modern man.

Recently, however, our spirits were warmed by a letter from *Harper's* inviting us to join the "relatively small group of highly discriminating people" who receive their journal. As a part of the come-on we were told that a forthcoming issue would begin a series of articles on the "normally taboo subject of religion."

We were reassured to say the least and a bit puzzled too. Just imagine a leading journal of liberal thought in America blazing the trail to that "controversial" and "taboo subject" with the implication that these articles are practically certain to "startle" the "orthodox." Certainly this promotional approach should sell the sophisticated modern mind that long ago dismissed the religious question.

But in our puzzlement we were not so reassured. Where have the editors of *Harper's* been for the last decade? "Taboo"? Really, fellows, a list of the magazines that have recently featured religion would be as long as our memory could make it. In fact, the last we heard *Esquire* was planning an article on Tillich. And just imagine what *Playboy* could do for religion!

By reason of *Harper's* calibre in other areas, we can expect the discussion to be carried on at a high level without worrying about Jonah and the whale, etc., and we will probably not be disappointed. Yet we wonder about this somewhat sensational approach. Does it indicate a responsible, rooted interest in the question: "What can a modern man believe?" Or has *Harper's*, along with folks in almost every enterprise including the Church, found that religion is a marketable commodity?

W. H. C.

### 'NOT BY DREAD ALONE'

LAST SUMMER, the Archbishop of Canterbury was asked to comment briefly on an essay by Philip Toynbee, "Nuclear Warfare and a Policy to Avoid It." The Archbishop's comments, along with contributions on the same theme by twenty-one other persons, were published with the essay. The resulting controversy centered around a misunderstanding in which the Archbishop was represented by the press as holding to the possibility that God may *will* the total annihilation of the human race by nuclear war. It is no wonder that there was a general revulsion against this interpretation of the Archbishop's statement.

Now the Archbishop has clarified his position about the prospect of total annihilation of the human race. Like many of us, he was the victim of being quoted out of context. In an article in *Frontier* (Oct. 1958), he explains that his main desire was to counteract the tendency to base a nuclear policy chiefly upon fear. "An American journal summed up my contribution excellently," he says, "by saying that it was 'a tart reminder that man cannot live by dread alone.'"

What the Archbishop actually wrote was that there is no evidence that the human race will last forever, and that we do not know whether it may come to an end as a result of nuclear war or by some other means in the providence of God. But he used this phrase, "providence of God," in a very broad sense. He did not mean that God might will the nuclear war, but that God wills man's freedom to make such evil and destructive choices. To suggest that God may will the nuclear war itself is to make light of the evil in it and to undercut the resolution to find ways of preventing it. It was this intolerable suggestion that many people read into the original statement by the Archbishop.

There was another side of the Archbishop's position that is quite sound and that needs repeated statement though it may be even more difficult for any of us to appropriate it fully. It is the conviction that, whatever happens, God remains sovereign and that even the hardest choices that we may have to make when one duty seems to conflict with another can be made in faith without fear: "The Christian has to make many fearful choices, but his decision must be fearless."

About this there can be in principle no doubt, no matter what side we may take on any of the issues that now perplex us. There are grave risks in any nuclear policy, either in emphasizing the deterrent nuclear power or in any unilateral abandonment or weakening of the deterrent. Awareness



of these risks may strengthen the determination to seek new policies that will have some chance of reducing tensions, but there is no road that is now clearly marked to that goal or to the goal of national security against war or to sure national survival in the event of war. Faith in God's ultimate rule of power and love is the one clear basis for action without self-deception or fear amidst these risks.

There are two issues raised by the debate about the Archbishop's statement that require much more discussion. One is the question as to whether or not man is free to destroy the whole human race. There are many Christians who are sure that in spite of man's apparent freedom to do this, there are resources beyond our knowledge by which God can check or overrule such a final demonstration of human sin and folly. In groups of theologians here and in Europe this subject has been debated, and both the view that man does have the free-

dom to destroy the human race and the view that God will set limits to such destruction have been strongly set forth. This writer agrees with the Archbishop of Canterbury that God does not will such a dreadful end of history but that he may permit it because of what we know in principle about man's freedom and because of what we know concretely about the technology of weapons.

There is another whole area of discussion to which we shall return at some future time. We might call it the "ethics of annihilation." What does the possibility of annihilation do to our sense of priorities in ethical decision? What are we to say about the choice between liberty and death if death means the annihilation of the race? What are we to say about the choice between temporary tyranny and irreversible genetic distortion of the human race that may be worse than death? These questions need to be frankly discussed among us.

J. C. B.

## An Optimistic Look at the Fifth Republic

J. B. DUROSELLE

THAT MOST ILLUSTRIOUS of French political scientists, André Siegfried, recognized in the Third Republic a law of great importance: that of a deep stability among the French voters, three-fifths of whom voted for the Left and two-fifths for the Right. The only change that has occurred is the evolution within the parties toward the Right. In the process splinter parties like the old Monarchist Party have tended to disappear and have been absorbed within the larger parties.

On the September 28, 1958 about 80 per cent of the French people voted in favor of the new constitution. On November 23 and 30 more than 55 per cent of the votes went to the so-called Rightist parties and less than 45 per cent to the parties that are designated as Leftist. The Marxists (Communist and Socialist), who in 1946 exceeded 52 per cent, did not reach 40 per cent in 1958.

Obviously there is a great upheaval in France today. How are we to interpret it? What are its causes, its manifestations and its possible effects? France and her friends are passionately concerned by these questions, and I wish to offer my own interpretation of them.

### The Fourth Republic: Instability

The Fourth Republic was based upon the Constitution of October 1946, which was adopted by a feeble majority of the electorate with almost one-third of the electorate abstaining. It would have liked to have been the "Constitution of the Resistance," the expression of the will toward renewal among those men who had staked their liberty and life against the Nazi Occupation. Actually the Fourth Republic was a compromise between the Communist members of the Resistance, who wanted a weak and "fluid" regime that would allow them to develop successfully their "agitation" tactics and the non-Communist members of the Resistance who were intent upon making great social reforms. It was also a compromise between the Resistance members and the old personnel of the Third Republic who were eager to recover their influence. Concentrating virtually all of the power in the National Assembly, the Fourth Republic could survive only if the Assembly had stable majorities. Thus the very division within the French people, the existence of a then powerful Communist Party, the intemperate use of "proportional representation" at the election (more exact superficially, but incapable of producing a stable majority): all these factors led the regime

Mr. Duroselle is a foremost French political scientist who has written widely in both French and American scholarly journals. This is his second appearance in *Christianity and Crisis*. This article was translated by Sarah F. Terrien.

from start to finish into the most stultifying incoherence.

To be sure, the Fourth Republic, animated by the spirit of the Resistance, reached some notable goals: it rebuilt a devastated France; it launched boldly into economic expansion; and it had a remarkable social policy (the French social security system is one of the strongest in the world). France is the only large country that has in principle established equality of wages between men and women and then has rigorously applied this principle.

But the weakness of the regime, due to the absence of a stable majority, had two serious results. First, French foreign policy was notoriously impotent. Weakness permits no dynamic solutions, and France needed decisive ones for the sake of her colonial empire. She contented herself with half measures. She conducted a war in Indo-China for eight years without sending sufficient reinforcements and, at the same time, without seeking to negotiate before the catastrophe. She proposed the integration of Europe and, after two years of hesitation, rejected the European Defense Community. In 1950 she refused to admit Germany into NATO, only to accept her in 1954 after four years of lost time.

Furthermore, the Fourth Republic was unable to give France a strong currency. The French franc was repeatedly devaluated and always sold below its official rate. It is not necessary to dramatize the short-term consequences of this phenomenon: people get used to inflation and, furthermore, from 1952 to 1958 France was the one country of the world in which the standard of living increased by more than fifty per cent. There are more automobiles in France per 100 inhabitants than in England. But in the long run a weak currency makes exportation more difficult and, above all, makes importation more costly, for people speculate on the probability of a fall in currency value. Monetary weakness is thus a continuous curb to economic expansion.

### **Algeria, "the Heart of the Problem"**

This state of affairs might well have lasted for a long time if there had not been the war in Algeria. Begun on November 1, 1954 by the Moslem Nationalists, the conflict immediately assumed a particular importance for the French. Each year billions of francs are poured into it and an army of 500,000 men is maintained. Why? Here we come to the heart of the problem, the

phenomenon that undermined the foundations of the Fourth Republic.

Of the nine million inhabitants of Algeria, 1,200,000 are of European descent. This is as if there were 40 million Englishmen in India. The "decolonization" of a territory comprising strong national elements is not as easily accomplished as in one where only an army and several thousand administrators are involved. England does not act in Kenya as she did in Burma.

Also, soldiers sent from France for combat in Algeria, far from being converted by the experience to the idea that Algerian independence is necessary, were for the most part persuaded that the country must remain French. Whether it be deplored or extolled, the fact is there. French youth returned home from military service in Algeria convinced that the bonds must be maintained, and on the whole they brought their families to this conviction, even in numerous instances where these families voted the Communist ticket. This is probably due to the fact that the Algerian F.N.L. (Front of National Liberation) is a totalitarian organization and has attempted to impose itself upon the Moslems by terror. Within four years it has massacred 10,000 Algerian Moslems, which clearly indicates that it does not obtain unanimity. The soldiers, and especially the officers, have reached the conclusion that if the army goes and Algeria becomes independent, there will immediately be terrible reprisals not only against the Europeans but especially against the numerous pro-French Moslems. Little by little in the French army there arose a question of honor: "We will never abandon our friends to the vengeance of our enemies. Never."

From the *never* came the revolt of Algiers on May 13th. The European colonists (for the most part poor people with a standard of living averaging 20 per cent less than that of metropolitan Frenchmen) experienced rising anger towards a regime whose instability was a constant threat to their survival. They feared the possibility that a new ministerial crisis might bring to power a government willing to come to terms with the F.N.L. A similar situation had developed in Morocco and Tunisia. The essential point was agreement by the army. In no way is the army linked to the interests of the influential colonists; it is not predisposed to maintain the privileges of Europeans in Algeria. The large majority of junior officers, contrary to rumors carefully perpetrated, is liberal and egalitarian. The perhaps unfulfillable dream of raising the living standard among the Moslems to

the same level as that of the French is widespread in the French army.

The fact remains that this army, being held responsible and accused by weak French governments of every failure, sensitive to a certain form of national pride, convinced that its honor requires it never to abandon the friends of France, has for the time being allied itself with the colonists. This was the cause of the bloodless revolt of May 13th. The results are well known, the principal one being the coming to power of General de Gaulle, who had been kept away from the government ever since his sudden resignation in January, 1946.

### The Fifth Republic

Now for the present. After six months of a curious dictatorship, a provisional one in which the press was free and there were no arbitrary arrests, France has been gradually entering her Fifth Republic.

Its beginnings are quite different from those of the Fourth. Eighty per cent of the French approved it; 80 per cent of the "grand electors" elected de Gaulle President of the Republic. Between those two votes the Assembly elections took place on two separate ballots. This system, with the deals it permits among the candidates between the first and the second ballots, crushed the Communists by reducing their deputies to ten, a low number considering that they represent 20 per cent of the voters. But the majority system always has this effect upon isolated parties.

Much more significant are the following facts. The Communists have lost 1,500,000 votes since January, 1956. This is their first serious defeat. The number of party members, approaching 1,000,000 in 1947, today is 200,000 and continues to decline. The C.G.T. (the General Confederation of Labor), made up of Communist labor unions, loses votes at almost every election for "workers' delegates." The Communists have just shut down four of their daily papers, and the circulation of the remaining five amounts to only 500,000 (of which 200,000 belong to *L'Humanité*).

Many signs indicate that this is only the beginning of a wane in the party's influence. Unless there is a serious economic crisis, the French Communist Party, now back at the percentage level of 1936, will be reduced to that of its Belgian counterpart, which numbers about five per cent of the voters. This general decline can be explained chiefly by the fact that the Communists supported the F.N.L. It can also be explained by the rising standard of living among the masses.

A second characteristic of the situation today is the disappearance of the so-called "Leftist intellectuals," who were grouped around the former Prime Minister Mendes-France and the weeklies *L'Express* and *France-Observateur*. Generally speaking, the electorate was merciless toward those who recommended a vote of "No" for the constitutional referendum. To everyone's surprise, as well as to his own, Mendes-France was literally crushed on the first ballot by a liberal young lawyer. Men like Bourges-Maunoury never obtained more than a few thousand votes.

Very likely their tactics were responsible for their failures. First, to what end could their "No" lead? To a return to the Fourth Republic, which did not know how to reform itself? Or to a *coup d'état* by the parachutists? Second, their entire propaganda was conducted on the "bad conscience" theme: France must be ashamed of what she is doing in Algeria and elsewhere. But an invitation to remorse does not make a country wild with enthusiasm.

Perhaps the most interesting feature of the present situation is the infatuation with new personalities. In countless cases remarkable men were defeated simply because they had played leading roles in the Fourth Republic. However, 25 per cent of the voters have elected a new group claiming to be more Gaullist than the others. This is the "Union for the New Republic" of Soustelle, Debré and Frey. The U.N.R. takes root everywhere and has just won almost 200 deputy seats.

In the new National Assembly, which has less power than the former one, the deputies are no longer seated as "Right" and "Left" but as "majority" and "opposition," separated by an aisle in the Tremicycle. The most important fact is that the new Constitution will make what was known as "the little ministerial game" impossible. Under the Fourth Republic when a cabinet had lasted for several months, impatience mounted among those who aspired to become ministers. They overthrew the ministry without career risk for the chance of getting themselves appointed to the next cabinet. Today this has been abolished: a deputy who becomes a minister ceases to be a deputy.

On the other hand, the new Constitution provides for the dissolution of the government by a decree of the President with the same consequences as in Great Britain. The cause for overthrowing a cabinet will thus have to be extremely serious. This essential reform, which the Fourth Republic had never been able to realize, is now accomplished.

At the present moment France has a stable sys-



tem with an assured majority that is composed of fresh blood, and it is also closely associated with a man who possesses both the prestige of experience and great skill—Charles de Gaulle. France transformed herself by avoiding civil war and dictatorship.

### ...And its Future

There remains the future. It certainly does not lie in the hands of one man, not even de Gaulle's. Furthermore, France is not alone in the world, and in part the future will come from the outside world.

It must not be thought of in terms of unstable governments. The presence of de Gaulle, who will be President for seven years with a prime minister whom he will choose from among his followers, guarantees that there will be a stable French policy. Although like all policies, it is subject to human error, it will at least have the advantage of existing.

Pessimists say that de Gaulle will be gradually overwhelmed, that Jacques Soustelle—the hero of May 13th, the dictator-apprentice, the dangerously ambitious man—will little by little take over the reins of government, that French democracy is threatened at once by the strong will of Soustelle and by the inertia of the French people. In the first place it is not certain that Soustelle is, after all, so anti-democratic. Then, the fact that the French were so apathetic in defense of the despised Fourth Republic last May does not prove that they would be equally apathetic were it a matter of defending democracy itself. Those who claimed that de Gaulle was a second Mussolini did not have much success because the French knew this simply was not true.

The pessimists say further that de Gaulle will fail. They are sure that his policy of providing for industrial expansion in Algeria will not bring the war to an end. They say it is impossible to furnish materials for both Algeria and France, to construct a plant for enriched uranium, to produce atomic bombs, to wage war, and to participate in the European Common Market. If de Gaulle fails, these same pessimists foresee a mass return of the Communists.

To all these objections, the optimists reply that failure is highly improbable in the present state of the French economy. The great new financial, budgetary and monetary reform is based not only upon the creation of a strong currency, but also upon the stepping-up of investments. The large majority of French industrialists and farmers op-

timistically accept the Common Market and believe that they may even compete with Germany. Finally, every week there are new oil discoveries in the Sahara. The oil-bed of Hassi-Messaoud is so gigantic that its size has not yet been ascertained. The Sahara petroleum reserves have already reached the potentialities of those of Saudi Arabia. By 1970 the Sahara may be the greatest oil exporting region in the world.

Will this oil be French? Here we come back to the Algerian question. Personally I believe that Algeria will become increasingly independent but not according to the plans of the F.N.L., which are fanatically intolerant, pro-Nasser and even pro-Communist. It will be an independence progressively realized on a basis satisfactory to the whole population. It will also be an independence in association with France. It will be the most highly industrialized independence among Arab countries. It will be the independence of a pro-West Algeria. Against all odds, de Gaulle appears to be making an advance in this direction. The riches of the Sahara will come to his aid. They will be the consolidation of a fruitful association.

At the present when everything in France tends toward the dynamic, when the birth rate is high and when the old *petit-bourgeois* traditions are crumbling, I believe the optimists are right.

## CORRESPONDENCE

### Catholic and Protestant 'Pressure': A Difference in Kind or Degree?

TO THE EDITORS: While I, as a Roman Catholic, think it very unlikely that Mr. Clancy will be able to meet the challenge Paul Blanshard laid down in his letter (Dec. 8 issue), at least to the point of presenting a statement by a Bishop to the effect that Catholics were free in conscience to vote as they pleased concerning the Massachusetts birth control referenda, some further questions must be put to Mr. Blanshard.

The central point Mr. Blanshard has made in his letters is that the analogy that Catholics attempt to draw between their use of moral pressure and that used by Protestants is a false analogy for the simple reason that Protestant pressure is "based on free discussion by free men" (Oct. 13 issue) while Catholic pressure is determined by authoritarian fiat imposed on the mass of Catholic believers by the hierarchy.

Two questions must be raised if Mr. Blanshard is to be fully successful in denying the analogy. When Mr. Blanshard says (Oct. 13 issue), "I know of no American church that attempted to coerce its members into a prohibition vote by threat of theological penalties. I know of no American Protestant who was excommunicated for voting wet,"

is he prepared to offer some evidence that those Catholics who voted against the moral judgment of the hierarchy in Massachusetts were in any way under a "threat of theological penalties" or "excommunicated for voting" as they did? Granted that, from the evidence Mr. Blanshard presents (Dec. 8 issue), there is no reason to think that Catholics were not pressured by the hierarchy, this is still *not* the same thing as a threat of either penalty or excommunication. Unless Mr. Blanshard can prove that there was such a "threat," there is no reason why one is forced to look upon the pressure there as anything but *moral* pressure. Even granting further that, by the very nature of Catholicism, such moral pressure will have a strong influence on the average Catholic, this is still not the same thing as proving that the difference between Protestant and Catholic pressure is in *kind* rather than *degree*.

The second question has bearing on the first. It is this: What evidence can Mr. Blanshard present that Protestant pressure groups or even the official or semi-official statements of Protestant groups or councils actually represent the views of the Protestant laity? For instance, does Mr. Blanshard have any evidence that Protestant pressures against bingo in New York were the result of a vote or poll of some kind taken among Protestants? Or, even more recently, the Fifth World Order Conference in Cleveland, with delegates from thirty-three groups associated with the National Council of Churches, urged that Red China be admitted to the United Nations and that their Government be recognized by our Government. Yet Dr. Norman Vincent Peale and Dr. Daniel A. Poling objected to this state-

ment, saying it did not represent the views of the majority of Protestants. Regardless of whether it does or not, there is no evidence to suggest that the resolution was the result of a vote among Protestant laity. And, as a resident of Massachusetts, I have not read or heard of any vote being taken in Protestant churches authorizing Protestant groups to take a stand against a proposed state lottery. Yet most have taken such a stand. One can only assume that, even within Protestant circles, decisions to exert pressure, if they are based at all "on free discussion by free men," are based on the discussions held among Protestant church leaders, lay or clerical, and are democratic in the same way that a decision by the Catholic church is not just the result of somebody's whim but are decisions based on the views of the majority of Catholic Bishops, priests and theologians. In neither case is the average Catholic consulted. In both cases the decision to exert pressure is made by church leaders and officials. Certainly, once decisions are made, the Catholic Church has more effective means of making these decisions binding on the laity, but the point at issue here is not the problem of control but rather the *way* in which decisions are made.

If Mr. Blanshard can produce some evidence that Protestant pressure groups are the result of rank and file Protestant demands and not, as it appears, the decisions of Protestant leaders following their own consciences, then the analogy Mr. Blanshard objects to can be rejected. Until that time there is no reason to reject the analogy.

DANIEL J. CALLAHAN  
Cambridge, Mass.

#### In Our Next Issue

COLBERT S. CARTWRIGHT writes on the Church's political responsibility in the struggle for integration.

"It must be clearly understood that the case will not be won simply by sermons, counseling, Bible study, prayer, pronouncements, pamphlets and buzz groups. The case can only be won through the development of a national public policy which realistically develops procedures for implementing the high court edict banning compulsory public school racial segregation."

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